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Abstract 
Several studies have documented that employer incentives, in form of experience rating, 
co-insurance or deductibles, could decrease the social insurance usage.  Such employer 
incentives may though have unintended side effects, as it gives employers incentives to 
transfer the costs to their workers, affecting individual wages and inducing cream skim­
ming.  Side effects which have been given limited attention.  This paper aims to ﬁll one 
part of this gap in the literature. The effect off employer incentives on individual wages 
is estimated using a reform in January 1992, which introduced an employer co-insurance 
system into the Swedish sickness absence insurance. The analysis based on a long popu­
lation panel database, including survey information on hourly wages, gives no support of 
any important individual wage effects from the co-insurance reform. This is not a result 
of lack of variation in individual wage increases, nor is it a result of large standard errors. 
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Experience rating, co-insurance and other types of employer incentives are key compo­
nents of many social insurance systems. Employer incentives is, for instance, present in 
workers compensation/disability insurance in USA, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, and 
New Zeeland, in unemployment insurance in USA, and in sickness insurance in Germany 
and Sweden.  In these schemes the insurance tax rate each ﬁrm pay is adjusted upwards 
or downwards to reﬂect the costs of the insurance claims made by their workers, and/or 
the ﬁrm is responsible to pay parts of the beneﬁts directly to their workers.  The main 
idea behind these policy instruments are to correct the incentives faced by employers in 
order to avoid inefﬁciently high social insurance take up rates. For instance, if workers are 
covered by social insurance employers have less incentive to reduce temporary lay offs, 
and less incentive to improve the work environment, as the government is responsible for 
paying social insurance beneﬁts. The literature mainly conﬁrms that employers incentives 
indeed can decrease the social insurance usage.1  These employer incentives may though 
have unintended side-effects.  In this paper I investigate whether employer incentives in 
social insurance affect individual wages. 
Employer incentives in form of experience rating and co-insurance introduce a direct 
cost for employers when the insurance is used by their workers.  Besides taking actions 
to decrease the take up rates, employers have other ways to avoid this direct cost. Specif­
ically they may shift over the costs to the workers by adjusting individual wages, giving 
insurance prone workers lower wage increases. If such wage effects are present in health 
related insurances like disability insurance and sickness insurance, workers with worse 
health will pay the employers direct costs through lower wages.  It will not only have 
large distributional effects, it will also transform the employer incentives into worker 
incentives.  The direct costs also provide employers with incentives to engage more in 
1For studies on experience rating in unemployment insurance in USA, see Topel1983, 1985, Deere (1991), 
Card and Levine (1994), Anderson and Meyer (1994), Anderson and Meyer (1994) and Jurajda (2004). For 
studies on disability insurance and sickness insurance in Canada see Bruce and Atkins (1993), Hyatt and 
Thomason (1998), and from Netherlands in de Jong and Lindeboom (2004) and Koning (2004), and ﬁnally 
from USA disability insurance in Ruser (1985), Moore and Viscusi (1989), Ruser (1991), Thomason (1993) 
and Ruser (1993). 
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clining health status.  A ﬁnal side-effect is that employers may try to decrease workers 
access to the insurances, by contesting individual insurance claims.2 
These side-effects have largely been ignored in the empirical literature. For social in­
surance, four exceptions are Anderson and Meyer (2000), Hyatt and Kralj (1995), Thoma­
son and Pozzebon (2002), and Harcourt et al. (2007).  Anderson and Meyer (2000) ﬁnd 
wage effects and that employer’s claim-contesting rate increases as a result of experience 
rating in unemployment insurance. The results in Hyatt and Kralj (1995) and Thomason 
and Pozzebon (2002) suggests that employers claim-contesting rate increases as a results 
of experience rating in Canada disability insurance.  Finally, Harcourt et al. (2007) ﬁnd 
that experience rating induces ﬁrms to more often discriminate against insurance prone 
workers in their hiring procedure. Related studies are also Gruber (1994) and Baicker and 
Chandra (2005) who study the individual wage effects from introducing mandated ma-
ternity beneﬁts and from growth in health insurance premiums, respectively.  This quite 
limited evidence is unfortunate, since all effects of different incentives have to be taken 
into account in order to design an optimal insurance. 
This paper aims to ﬁll one gap in this literature.  I estimate the individual wage ef­
fects from an employer co-insurance reform in the Swedish sickness insurance in January 
1992.  The sickness insurance replaces forgone income due to temporary health prob­
lems. Prior to 1992 the beneﬁts were ﬁnanced by uniform pay-roll taxes and all beneﬁts 
were paid directly from the government. The reform in January 1992 gave employers the 
responsibility to pay the full cost for all absence during the ﬁrst fourteen days of each 
absence period among their workers. As the incidence of short-term absence varies sub­
stantially, the reform increased employers cost of some workers, and for others the costs 
were reduced. 
The individual wage effects are estimated using a long population panel database. 
The data set have several features which makes it especially suitable for investigating 
individual wage effects. It includes a large set of individual variables. The individuals can 
2The employers may also try to discourage workers from submitting claims, or delaying submitting infor­
mation to the insurance authority. 
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employers. The data set is also beneﬁcial since it includes survey information on actual 
wages, and not wage created from annual earnings and some measure of hours worked. 
There are also very detailed information on the absence of each individual, including the 
start and end date of every single absence spell.  Since the employer co-insurance cost 
depends on the number of absence days, I can infer the co-insurance cost the employers 
have for each worker. In this way we can follow the absence decisions, employment status 
and the nominal wages for each individual several years before as well as after the reform. 
All these features of the data allow us to deliver more credible evidence of the individual 
wage effects. 
Besides offering new evidence to the previous limited evidence this study contributes 
in other ways. First of all, we provide evidence for Swedish sickness insurance, which re­
semblance many workers compensation and disability insurances around the world. Pre­
vious evidence on the other hand is for other types of insurances, and as there is no reason 
to expect that the effect is the same across insurances this study contributes with valu­
able insights. Second, previous evidence is concentrated to USA, where wages are more 
often bargained on individual level compared with many European countries. Our study 
therefore contribute with estimation results that are very relevant for labor markets with 
somewhat less degree of individual wage bargaining, such as in many European countries. 
As comparison, Nilsson (1993) estimate that locally bargained wage increases accounted 
for 45 percent of the total wage increases in Sweden, in other words individual wage 
bargaining is an important feature also on the Swedish labor market. 
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple bargaining model, which 
can be used to analyze the expected effects of employer incentives in social insurance. The 
model is set up in two stages with exogenous respectively endogenous sickness absence. 
It gives several important insights that guide the empirical model.  Section 3 describes 
Swedish sickness insurance and the employer co-insurance reform in 1992.  Section 4 
presents the empirical strategy, and the main results as well as extensive robustness anal­
ysis are presented in section 5. Finally section 6 concludes. 
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The purpose of the theoretical model is to analyze how employer incentives in form of a 
direct tax costs for all absence within the ﬁrm is expected to affect individual wages and 
individual sickness absence. The focus is on a mandatory public insurance system where 
all workers are entitled to beneﬁts, regardless of the size of the tax cost.  First a model 
with exogenous sickness absence considered and then is the model extended to allow for 
endogenous sickness absence. The simple bargaining model gives a couple of important 
insights, which is used to guide the empirical model and to interpret our results. 
2.1  Model with exogenous sickness absence 
The basic set up is as follows.  Each ﬁrm employs one worker which is permanently 
attached to the ﬁrm.  The ﬁrms produce one good using labor as the only input, and for 
simplicity it is assumed that they operate using a constant return to scale technology. The 
price of the good is further normalized to one.  The permanently attached worker has a 
pre-speciﬁed contract of normal working time, h. The contracted working time is set by 
the labor market institutions, and is therefore taken as exogenous by both the ﬁrms and 
the workers. The productive working time is then the contracted time minus the time the 
worker is absent from work, s. 
The ﬁrm has several costs, in addition to the labor cost which is simply the number of 
hours worked times the hourly wage, w. They have a ﬁxed cost, c. Further a direct cost, τ, 
for each hour their single worker is absent from work. If τ = 0 it corresponds to a social 
insurance system with no direct employer incentives. The ﬁrms proﬁt function is then 
π = A(h − s) − w(h − s) − τs − c,  (1) 
where A represents the productivity of the ﬁrm. 
The worker receives utility from consumption and leisure.  Consumption equals the 
sum of income from work, and the income in form of social insurance beneﬁts collected 
while being absent from work. Leisure equals the number of absence hours. I assume the 
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u = (h − s)w + bs + δ ln(s),  (2) 
where b is the hourly social insurance beneﬁt level, and δ is the value the worker places 
on leisure. Assuming δ > 0, we have that the worker values leisure but at a declining rate. 
The worker and the employer bargains over the wage, and I assume that the outcome 
of the bargaining game is given by the Nash bargaining solution.  The ﬁrms agreement 
point π0 is assumed to be zero, and the workers agreement point u0 is assumed to be 
u0 = bh + δ ln(h).  (3) 
The utility the worker gets if the work is terminated, under the assumptions that the worker 
then can collect social insurance beneﬁts corresponding to full working time. 
Introducing β as the bargaining power of the worker. The solution to the Nash prob­
lem is then given by 
w = arg max[π]1−β [u − u0]β .  (4) 
Solving for the ﬁrst order condition for the maximum gives a closed form solution for the 
hourly wage, w, as 
δ (1 − β )(lnh − lns)) − cβ − sτβ 
w = Aβ + b(1 − β )+  .  (5)
h − s 
Note that the wage is increasing in the workers bargaining power, the productivity of the 
ﬁrm, the social insurance beneﬁt level, the workers value of leisure, and decreasing in 
the costs associated with sickness absence. As individual wage effects is the topic of this 
paper, we more closely investigate how the wage depends on the sickness absence rate, s. 
We have 
dw  csβ + hsτβ + δ (1 − β )(h − s − slnh + slns)
= −  .  (6)
ds  s(h − s)2 
This expression provides several interesting insights.  The worker suffers a ”wage 
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in the ﬁxed cost for the ﬁrm, c, and in the direct tax cost, τ, associated with sickness 
absence. Naturally if the tax costs the employers have to pay is larger we expect a larger 
individual wage effect. The wage penalty effect which goes through c is less expected and 
something that might have been missed without a formal model. The intuition is however 
straightforward.  If the worker is often absent the ﬁxed cost per actual hour worked is 
larger, making the ﬁrm less proﬁtable which in turn affect wages.  It means that even 
if the tax cost τ is zero we expect to ﬁnd a negative relation between the wage and the 
sickness absence. Note that this conclusion is made even under assumption that there are 
no additional costs associated with sickness absence. In a real world economy one could 
think about costs associated with, for instance, ﬁnding replacement workers. If such costs 
are present it would be another reason to ﬁnd a negative relationship between wages and 
absence. It is also clear that the ”wage penalty” depend on the bargaining power, β . The 
wage penalty is low for individuals with low bargaining power. 
2.2  Model with endogenous sickness absence 
In the above model the individual sickness absence was assumed to be exogenous. How­
ever, when the worker decides to go to work or not, for example when having a cold, it 
is reasonable to believe that they take any wage effect from being absent into consider­
ation.  The model is therefore extended into to a simple game allowing for endogenous 
sickness absence. The set up of the game is as follows; in the ﬁrst step the worker decides 
their sickness absence, and in the second step of the game the worker and the employer 
bargains over the wage.4  We further assume that the worker have full information of the 
outcome of the wage bargaining. The solution to the second step is thus the same as for 
the model with exogenous sickness absence. 
Now consider the ﬁrst step of the game.  In the absence decision the worker faces a 
trade-off, higher sickness absence means increased utility from leisure, but also decreased 
3Note that the second part of the expression δ (1 − β )(h − s − s lnh + s lns) always is positive, as δ , the value 
of leisure, is assumed to be positive, β , the individual bargaining power, is between zero and one, and 
because h, the contracted number of hours, is larger or equal to s, the number of hours of sickness absence. 
4One could also consider a repeated game. The solution to our simple game would then be the equilibrium 
solution to the repeated game. 
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wage as a function of sickness absence in equation (5) into the worker utility function in 
equation (2), the utility is then only a function of sickness absence and for the worker 
exogenous variables 
u = (h − s)(Aβ + b(1 − β )) + δ (1 − β )(lnh − lns)) − cβ − sτβ + bs + δ (ln(s)  (7) 
Solving the ﬁrst order condition gives us a closed expression for the sickness absence rate 
δ 
s =  (8)
A − b + τ 
. 
This expression shows the expected relations. The absence rate is decreasing in the pro­
ductivity of the ﬁrm A, since higher productivity implies a larger production loss if absent 
from work and thereby a higher wage. The absence rate is further increasing in the work­
ers value of leisure, δ , and the social insurance beneﬁt level, b. This is natural since they 
both increase the value of being absent from work. The absence rate is decreasing in the 
size of the employer incentives tax, τ. If the tax is high it implies a larger wage penalty 
and thereby increases the cost of being absent from work. It is also clear that we predict 
that individuals who value leisure to a high degree, will be the once who relatively more 
often is absent from work both in a world with small respectively large employer incen­
tives. The endogeneity of the absence level of course also have important implications for 
the speciﬁcation of the empirical model. 
To summarize, the models predict that employer incentives in form of a direct tax 
costs for all absence within the ﬁrm affect individual wages, and that the effect is relative 
to the absence level of each individual. The model also shows that due to ﬁxed costs we 
expect a negative relationship between wages and absence even without such direct costs. 
Furthermore, it shows that the absence level should be treated as endogenous. These two 
last points have important implications for the empirical model. 
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3.1  Wage bargaining in Sweden 
Any paper investigating individual wage effects in Sweden have to discuss the so called 
’Swedish model’. The Swedish model is an often used term for describing the institutions 
in the Swedish labor market.  Some key features are/were centralized collective wage 
bargaining and extensive use of active labor market policy. Collective bargaining aimed 
at promoting wage equality.  But this stylized description is however not fully accurate. 
Historically there have always been wage bargaining at different levels, including local 
and individual wage bargaining.  For example Nilsson (1993) estimate that locally bar­
gained wage increases accounted for 45 percent of the total wage increases. Wage-setting 
institutions have also changed during the last three decades.  The degree of centralized 
bargaining started to decrease in the beginning of the 1980’s, see e.g. Edin and Holmlund 
(1995). The wage data used in this paper further demonstrate that individually bargained 
wage changes are important. 
There are also large differences between sectors in the bargaining power as well as 
in the degree of individual wage bargaining.  In general, individual wage bargaining is 
more important for highly educated workers and workers employed in the private sector. 
The wages for public servants is more often dictated by collective agreements. It suggests 
that any individual wage effects should be more prominent for highly educated in the 
private sector.  As we theoretically expect larger wage effects for individuals with high 
bargaining power, this also suggests larger individual wage effects for highly educated 
workers. Detailed analysis of heterogeneous effects is therefore performed. 
3.2  Swedish sickness insurance 
This section presents the main feature of the Swedish sickness insurance during the re­
search period (1989-1994).  Sweden has compulsory national sickness insurance.  It is 
mainly ﬁnanced by a proportional payroll tax and replaces earnings forgone due to (tem­
porary) health problems that prevent the insured worker from doing his regular work tasks. 
The beneﬁts could be collected for any health problem, ranging from a cold to a serious 
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ous in an international comparison. This can for instance be shown by the fact that most 
workers received 90 percent of their lost income from the ﬁrst day in the late 1980’s. A 
beneﬁt cap excluded workers at the very top of the income distribution from receiving 
the full 90 percent.  Most Swedish workers were, however, also covered by negotiated 
sickness insurance programmes regulated in agreements between the labor unions and the 
employer confederations. 
The public insurance does not verify claimants’ eligibility during the ﬁrst beneﬁt 
week.  At the start of a spell, the worker has to call the public social insurance ofﬁce 
(and the employer) to report sickness.  The individuals are then entitled to collect bene­
ﬁts from the ﬁrst day of their absence spell.5  Within a week, at the latest on the eighth 
day of sickness, the claimant should verify eligibility by showing a doctor’s certiﬁcate 
that proves reduced work capacity due to sickness.  The public insurance ofﬁce judges 
the certiﬁcate and decides about further sick leave.  The public insurance had until re­
cently no limit to how often or how long beneﬁts would be paid. Many sickness absence 
spells continue for more than a year. These spells end mostly in disability insurance, early 
retirement or in old age retirement. 
3.3  The 1992 employer co-insurance reform 
Before 1992 the government was responsible for paying all sickness absence beneﬁts. 
Every employee could ﬁle a claim and receive beneﬁts directly from the government if 
they had temporary health problems. These beneﬁts were ﬁnanced by a uniform propor­
tional pay-roll tax. In January 1992 the system was changed, and employers were obliged 
to pay sickness beneﬁts for their own workers during the ﬁrst two weeks of every sick­
ness absence period.  Hence, these beneﬁts are denoted sickness pay, and we will refer 
to absence during the ﬁrst two weeks of every absence period as short-term absence, and 
all other absence as long-term absence. Since there were no qualifying day in 1992, this 
meant that employers were given the responsibility to pay sickness pay even if the worker 
was absent from work for a single day.  For absence spells longer than two weeks the 
5In 1993 was a qualifying day introduced. 
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turn the social insurance part of the pay-roll taxes was reduced from 10.1% to 8.2%. The 
new system can therefore most accurately described as an employer co-insurance system, 
where the ﬁnancial costs for a single worker claim is divided between the government and 
the employer.6 
The government declared several reasons for changing the system.  First, there were 
budget reasons.  Second, administrating every short-term sick absence were an admin­
istrative burden for the insurance system.  Third, it was believed that the reform would 
induce the employers to improve the work environment and increase the ﬁrms monitor­
ing efforts.  Fourth, it was intended to make the insurance fairer.  Employers in general 
have more information about their workers compared to the government. It was therefore 
believed that employers would be able to make more accurate beneﬁt payments, which 
would make the insurance more fair. 
The reform has several features, which makes it suitable for investigating individual 
wage effects. The reform was rapidly implemented, and thus individuals had small possi­
bilities to change their behavior before the reform was implemented. It is also reasonable 
to expect costs associated with short-term absence to be important for the ﬁrms. The rela­
tive individual short-term absence is quite stabile over time, and in contrast with long-term 
absence, workers with regular spells of short-term absence usually stay in the workplace. 
Combined with the fact that short-term absence varies a lot between individuals, it means 
that the employer co-insurance reform introduced large stable insurance cost for some 
workers and small stable insurance costs for other workers. The employers therefore have 
large incentives to shift over the cost, introduced by the reform, to their workers 
Data 
The data set used in the analysis comes from several different databases. From Statistics 
Sweden we have a set of socio-economic variables (e.g.  age, sex, income, immigration 
status and employment status), and also information that allows us to match each worker 
6The system was extended in 1997, requiring that employers pay sickness pay during the ﬁrst four, instead 
of two, weeks of absence. 
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12 to it current as well as past employers. I have sickness absence data from the Swedish So­
cial Insurance Agency (SSIA). The work absence database covers all absence periods for 
which sickness beneﬁts are paid from the government. Before the reform in 1992 forgone 
earnings due to work absence were replaced from day one of each spell, and thus include 
the register information on all absence due to sickness before the reform. Unfortunately 
didn’t the government collect information on the sickness pay paid by the employers after 
the reform. This means that we have no information on short-term absence, i.e. absence 
up until day 14 of every absence spell, after the reform. Long-term absence data is on the 
other hand available both before and after the reform. 
Our data also includes survey data on wages from Statistics Sweden’s wage statistics, 
consisting of high-quality information on actual wages, and not wages created from an­
nual earnings and some measurement of hours worked.  These wage data are collected 
by Statistics Sweden in cooperation with employer organizations, and includes the whole 
public sector, all large private ﬁrms and a random sample of small ﬁrms (ﬁrms with less 
than 200 workers). In total it cover about 50 percent of all private sector workers.7 
In the analysis wage data for 1989-1994 and sickness absence data from 1986 and 
onwards is used. The sample consists of all workers in working age (25-55), who worked 
in the same ﬁrm during two consecutive years. Working is deﬁned as having income above 
one base price amount, and collecting no unemployment insurance beneﬁts. The reason 
for this is that we want to focus our analysis on wage effects, and rule out any variation in 
wages due to individuals changing ﬁrm. The analysis is restricted to individuals working 
at least three consecutive years and for which we have wage data.8  I also exclude some 
extreme observations, those with 20 percent wage increase/decrease and/or more than 
100 days of short-term absence on average. Extensive robustness analysis shows that our 
results are quite insensitive to these restrictions. 
7As with all data sets there are some problems with the wage data-set;  the measurement period differs 
between sectors, the type of payments included in the hourly wage differs between the sectors, and the 
sampling scheme for the private sector have changed over time. However these problems are all mitigated 
since we only compare the wage increase between two years for individuals who stay at the same ﬁrm. 
8We impose this condition since we study the wage increase using sickness absence lagged two period as 
instrument for current absence, and the difference in absence lagged two period as an instrument for the 
difference in absence.  In order to take the wage difference and observe lagged sickness absence we need 
that the individual worked four consecutive years. 
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Wage  Short-term absence 
Nr.  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std. 
1990  640,577  13,960  4220  9.0  11.1 
1991  760,507  13,880  4140  8.5  10.8 
1992  777,297  14,550  4140 
1993  847,711  14,630  4200 
1994  878,611  15,580  4840 
For 1991 
Central government  184,392  14,960  3870  8.3  10.8 
Regional municipality  195,145  13,350  4380  8.6  10.7 
Local municipality  266,631  12,470  2670  9.6  11.4 
Private Blue-Collar  19,603  11,630  1530  10.6  12.4 
Private White-Collar  94,736  17,320  5180  5.4  7.9 
Female  485,702  12,580  2570  9.7  11.4 
Male  274,805  16,180  5240  6.4  9.3 
Non-immigrant  704,809  13,910  4130  8.4  10.6 
Immigrant  55,700  13,460  4250  10.5  12.5 
Age -30  71,462  13,330  3660  9.0  11.1 
Age 30-45  382,036  13,560  3590  8.7  10.8 
Age 45­ 307,009  14,410  4780  8.2  10.8 
Absence 0-10 days  541,136  14,330  4500 
Absence 10-20 days  126,569  13,060  3060 
Absence 20 days  92,802  12,390  2240 
Notes:  Wages is monthly full-time wages in SEK (not deﬂated).  Absence is yearly absence in days.  Short-term all days 
from day 1-14 of every spell.  Sector of employment is deﬁned using Statistic Sweden’s wage statistics. 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics over wages and absence for the individuals in 
our sample. The fact that a population database is used is reﬂected in the large number of 
observations. Also note that there are more females than males in our main sample. This 
is because females more often work in public sector, and we observe wages for everyone 
working in the public sector, but only for sub-set of everyone working in the private sector. 
The summary statistics show the expected patterns.  Males, non-immigrants, and more 
experienced workers have higher wages. There is an gradual increase in the mean wage 
during the period. Private white-collar workers have the highest wages. There is a clear 
correlation between wages and sickness absence. Those who are more often absent from 
work earn substantially less than those who never is absent from work.  The descriptive 
statistics for the absence data also show the expected patterns. Females, immigrants and 
older workers are more often absent from work.  Finally, is the absence much higher 
among blue-collar workers compared to white-collar workers. 
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The focus in this paper is to investigate whether the employer incentives introduced by the 
co-ﬁnance reform affected individual wages.  Two important questions is therefore how 
large the variation in absence and wage increases are within ﬁrms: that is if everyone in 
the same workplace receives the same wage increase? In order to answer these questions 
I have produced three ﬁgures.  Figure 1 displays the histogram for short-term absence 
in 1991, and Figure 2 and Figure 3 presents the residuals from regressions for short­
term absence in 1991 respectively for the wage change between 1992 and 1991. In these 
regressions include controls for gender, immigrant status, number of children, education 
level, type of education, sector of employment and workplace ﬁxed effects.  So that all 
focus is on the size of the within ﬁrm variation. 
Figure 1:  Histogram for short-term absence in 1991. 
These ﬁgures clearly show that there is large variation in both the sickness absence and 
in the wage changes. Figure 1 shows that there is a considerable amount of workers who 
is never absent from work a given year, whereas there are some workers who are absent 
more than 20 days a year. The large variations imply substantial differences in employer 
costs. Consider a worker who works about 220 days a year and is absent 20 days. Take a 
mean replacement rate of 80 percent. The employer provided sickness pay then amounts 
to about percent 7 percent of the wage cost. One could also note the spike for 14 days of 
short-term absence. The reason for this is that short-term absence is deﬁned as the total 
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covered by the employer co-insurance). It means that an individual that have one single 
absence spell of 14 days or longer will have 14 days of short-term absence. As apparent 
from Figure 2 these large absence differences also persists after controlling for a large set 
of control variables, including workplace ﬁxed effects. 
Figure 2:  Histogram for short-term absence residuals (1991). 
Similarly Figure Figure 3 displays large variation in the wage increases, even after 
controlling for a large set of variables, including workplace ﬁxed effects and education 
level. This ﬁgure together with the institutional details in Section 3 give a clear indication 
that there is room for individual wage bargaining on the Swedish labor market. 
Figure 3:  Histogram for wage increase residuals (1992-1991). 
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From the theory it follows that the individual wage, w, is likely to depend on productivity 
A, the individual social insurance beneﬁt level b, the individual value of leisure δ , the 
individual bargaining power β , the ﬁxed cost c and the tax cost associated with sickness 
absence τ.  Furthermore, the wage effect steaming from the ﬁxed costs c and the tax 
costs τ is directly related to the sickness absence, S, for individual i.  Without loss of 
generality the wage effect steaming from individual bargaining power, the beneﬁt level 
and the leisure value can be separated into a ﬁxed individual part αi and a time changing 
individual part vit . The wage for individual i in time period t is then 
lnwit = αt + γcSit + γττtSit + αi + vit .  (9) 
Here γc  and γτ  measures the impact of sickness absence on the individual wage going 
through c and τ, respectively.  My main interest is to estimate γτ , which measures the 
causal effect of an additional day of employer paid absence on individual wages. If γτ < 0, 
it means that after the co-insurance have been implemented those often absent suffer an 
wage penalty for each day they are absent from work. 
In order to consistently estimate γτ some identiﬁcation problems have to addressed; i) 
how to separate γτ from γc, ii) the selection problem that αi most likely is correlated with 
Si, iii) the endogeneity problem that wit also affects Si, and iv) that there may be trends in 
vit  correlated with Si.  In the following I give intuition behind and explain in detail how 
these four identiﬁcation problems are addressed. 
The ﬁrst problem arises since the individual absence level is expected to have an causal 
effect on the individual wage even without employer co-insurance. In order to solve this 
problem I exploit the exogenous variation in τ the size of employers tax cost associated 
with each additional day of worker absence, offered by the co-insurance reform in January 
1992. In equation (9) it can be expressed as τ = 0 before the reform, and if one normalize 
τ according to the size of the Swedish co-insurance employers incentives as τ = 1 after 
the reform.  Utilizing the panel structure of our data it is then possible to separate the 
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result of the co-insurance reform in 1992. 
Second, αi is most likely correlated with Si.  For instance, it is reasonable to believe 
that individuals with high productivity and high ambitions, both have a high wage as well 
as low sickness absence. In addition individuals with high bargaining power likely have 
both a high wage as well as an employment with good work environment, implying low 
sickness absence. Controlling for individual heterogeneity is therefore central. I control 
for all ﬁxed individual heterogeneity by focusing on wage increases.  Taking the ﬁrst 
difference of equation (9) it follows 
Δlnwit = αt − αt−1 + γc(Sit − Sit−1)+ γτ (τtSit − τt−1Sit−1)+ vit − vit−1. 
Consider the wage evaluation for different individuals after the reform. As τt = 0 before 
the reform in 1992 and τt = 1 after the reform, we have for 1992 
γτ (τ92Si92 − τ91Si91) = γτ Si92. 
However, note that this only holds if the employers are able to immediately transfer the 
full cost to their workers.  This is not likely, instead the wage increases are most likely 
negatively affected for often absent individuals also in 1993 and 1994. It can be taken into 
account by adding a time subscript on γτ , so that γτ,92 measures the wage effect in 1992 
and so on. Making the approximation that the absence level is constant, and noting that 
τ93 = τ92 = 1 we have for 1993 
γτ,93τ93Si93 − γτ,92τ92Si92 ≈ (γτ,93 − γτ,92)Si93. 
Making the same approximation for 1994 gives 
Δlnwit = λt + γc(Sit − Sit−1)+ γτ,92D92Sit +(γτ,93 − γτ,92)D93Sit  (10) 
+(γτ,94 − γτ,93)D94Sit + εit 
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hypothesis to test are then that γτ,92 < 0, γτ,93 − γτ,92 < 0, and γτ,94 − γτ,93 < 0, i.e.  an 
initial wage increase effect in 1992, and additional wage increase effects under 1993 
and 1994.  Note that the equation have been simpliﬁed by deﬁning λt ≡ αt − αt−1 and 
εit ≡ vit − vit−1. 
The third problem, the endogeneity of St , follows directly from the theory, which show 
that the wage is an important determinant of individual absence. The outcome of interest 
is the wage increase between time period t and t − 1. One way to address the endogeneity 
problem is to instrument current absence level, St , using absence lagged two period, St−2. 
Unless individuals are extremely forward locking the absence level today should by quite 
unaffected by future wage increase.  If such forward looking behavior is present it is 
likely of second order.  The exclusion restriction is thus likely to be fulﬁlled.  Later it 
is also shown that lagged absence is highly correlated with present absence, yielding a 
strong instrument.  In a similar way is the difference in absence instrumented using the 
absence difference lagged two periods. 
The ﬁnal problem arise since we may suspect trends in vit to be correlated with Si. For 
instance, the wage increases may vary across sectors and/or across individual character­
istics in a way that are correlated with individual sickness absence. If such trends are not 
taken into account the estimates will be biased.  I control for this problem in two ways. 
First of all, I stepwise introduce different observed variables, like gender, immigrant sta­
tus, sector of employment, ﬁrm controls and residence area into the wage difference equa­
tion. We also ﬂexibly interact these variables with calendar time. This will control for all 
trends in by us observed variables. Second, we include St into the model also before the 
reform, and measure the effect of the reform by St  time interactions.  It will control for 
trends in by us unobserved variables, as it controls for trends that are correlated with St . 
Our ﬁnal model to estimate using IV is then 
Δlnwit = λt + β Xit + γc(Sit − Sit−1)+ γsSit + γτ,92D92Sit +(γτ,93 − γτ,92)D93Sit  (11) 
+(γτ,94 − γτ,93)D94Sit + εit 
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contrasts the change between before and after the reform in the wage increases for those 
with high amount of short-term absence compared with those with low amount of short­
term absence.  If the wage increases jumps downward for those often absent from work 
at the same time as the reform, this is evidence of an effect of employer co-ﬁnance on 
individual wages. 
To summarize, our estimation strategy have several advantages, I have exogenous vari­
ation in the absence tax cost, I can control for unobserved heterogeneity in a ﬂexible way, 
and I handle the endogenous relation between wages and sickness absence. The detailed 
information on every single absence spell enables a detailed estimate of the co-insurance 
cost that the employers have for each worker, as the number of short-term absence days. 
However, the reform also introduces a data problem.  As described in Section 4 section 
we only have data on short-term absence before the reform, i.e.  there is no information 
on short-term absence in 1992,1993 and 1994. Obviously as we don’t have information 
on our endogenous explanatory variable after the reform we cannot obtain proper IV esti­
mates. Instead I run informative reduced form regressions using sickness absence lagged 
two periods.9  In addition I estimate informative ﬁrst regressions, for the years before the 
reform. In that we way we can, given that the ﬁrst stage relationship stays the same before 
and after the reform, reconstruct an IV estimate. 
6  Results 
6.1  First step estimates 
This section presents the ﬁrst step estimates. Remember that the analysis data set doesn’t 
include information on short-term absence after the reform, and thus no IV estimates 
could be obtained. As mentioned, instead I run informative placebo ﬁrst-step regressions 
for the pre-reform period, and reduced form regressions of the individual wage effect for 
the full period. Let’s start with the ﬁrst-step regressions for the pre-reform period. For the 
ﬁrst step estimates absence data for 1991 is used. The results from different ﬁrst step re­
9For 1994 we have to use sickness absence lagged three periods as short-term absence is only available up 
until 1991. 
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of sickness absence, with and without the control variables. The control variables include 
individual variables, and controls for municipality and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, the same vari­
ables as in the most extended speciﬁcation of equation (11), the ﬁnal model. The results 
show a very strong positive correlation between sickness absence and lagged sickness ab­
sence, and the relation is basically the same with or without control variables. Column 3 
presents the results when we use absence lagged three periods instead of absence lagged 
two periods. This result is presented since for 1994 absence lagged three periods is used 
as instrument, as information on short-term absence is only available up until 1991. Note 
that the coefﬁcient is almost identical as for absence lagged two periods. 
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Notes:  The table reports ﬁrst stage estimates for number of short-term absence days in 1991 and change in absence 
between 1991 and 1990.  Controls include a set of individual variables and section of occupation (2 digits).  Standard 
errors robust to heteroscedasticity and within ﬁrm correlation in parentheses.  ∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent 
level. 
The last two Columns of Table 2 present the ﬁrst step estimates for the one period 
difference in absence, with and without controls.  There is a strong negative correlation, 
which means that those who previously increased their absence two years later in gen­
eral experience a decrease in their absence.  This is likely an effect of mean reversion, 
where the past increase (decrease) reﬂects a negative (positive) health shock and the later 
decrease (increase) reﬂects the temporary nature of the previous shock. 
The presented ﬁrst step estimates clearly show that lagged absence is highly correlated 
with present absence during the pre-reform period. But the theoretical prediction is that 
individuals change their absence as an response to the reform.  If all individuals is less 
absent after the reform we still have a valid instrument, but with a lower coefﬁcient for the 
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relationship to reconstruct an IV estimate would then underestimate the true effect. More 
importantly, in a worst case scenario, those often absent from work before the reform is 
not so often absent after the reform, and those not absent before the reform starts to be 
absent after the reform.  If such ﬂipping behavior is present, it means that we only have 
a valid instrument before the reform. From the perspective of my theoretical model this 
is an unlikely outcome of the reform. It is also possible to perform a informal test of the 
ﬂipping hypothesis using long-term absence. If the ﬁrst stage relationship for long-term 
absence stays the same before and after the reform, it strengthens the argument against 
ﬂipping behavior. 
Table  3:  Placebo  ﬁrst  step  estimates.  Long-term  absence  explained  by  lagged  long-term  sickness 
absence. 
Pre-reform 1991  Post-reform 1992 
Day 14­ Day 14-56  Day 14­ Day 14-56 
St−2  0.114∗∗  0.149 ∗∗  0.083 ∗∗  0.097 ∗∗ 
(0.0033)  (0.0024)  (0.0032 )  (0.0025) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  735,803  735,803  750,618  750,618 
R2  0.021  0.035  0.016  0.025 
F  1235.7  3740.0  668.1  1521.4 
Notes:  The table reports ﬁrst stage estimates for number of long-term absence days in 1991 and 1992.  Day 14- refers 
to total number of absence days from day 14 and onwards of each spell, and 14-56 all such days between day 14 to 
day 56.  Controls include a set of individual variables and section of occupation (2 digits).  Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and within ﬁrm correlation in parentheses.  ∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
Table 3 presents the ﬁrst step estimates for the pre-reform period in 1991 and the 
post-reform period in 1992 for long-term absence. Long-term absence is deﬁned in two 
ways; as total number of days from day 14 and onwards of each spell, and also as all ab­
sence between day 14 to 56 of each absence spell. The estimates show that in general are 
lagged long-term absence a less strong predictor of future long-term absence compared 
with short-term absence and lagged short-term absence. But most importantly are lagged 
long-term a strong predictor of present absence both before and after the reform. The rela­
tionship is somewhat weaker after the reform, but the two estimates are only signiﬁcantly 
different from each other when using full long-term absence (day 14-).  I am therefore 
conﬁdent in the validity of the instrument both before and after the reform. 
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I now turn to the main reduced form estimates. Before presenting the estimates of equa­
tion (11), consider the results from a simple cross-sectional model as presented in Column 
1 of Table 4. The outcome is the wage in 1992 (the year of the reform) and as explanatory 
variable we have the absence level lagged two periods. The estimates show that there is a 
strong signiﬁcant cross-sectional relation between the wage and lagged absence. We have 
multiplied the wage with 100 and the coefﬁcient should therefore be interpreted as a 0.5 
percent wage decrease for each additional day of short-term absence.  For an individual 
who is often absent this implies a considerable wage effect.  However, as previously ar­
gued this estimate can reﬂect both selection as well as a general wage effect from absence, 
and is not necessarily an effect of the co-insurance reform. 
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Notes:  The outcome variable is the wage in 1992 (column1) and the diﬀerence between time period t and time period 
t-1  in  the  logarithm  of  the  wage  times  100.  Individual  variables  include  sex,  immigrant,  age,  age  squared,  type  of 
∗(∗∗) education and level of education.  Standard errors robust for within ﬁrm correlation and reported in parenthesis.
 
indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level.
 
Next, consider our causal estimates of equation (11) presented in column 2-5 of Ta­
ble 4.  The coefﬁcients of interest are the three interaction variables, D92St−2, D93St−2, 
and D94St−2, which measure the reduced form estimate of the additional wage increase 
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form.  Remember that the outcome is the difference in the logarithm of the wage times 
100, so that for instance the estimate for D92St−2 in Column 2 of −0.0094 means that 
one additional day of absence decreases the wage change with about 0.01 percent. It also 
means that the coefﬁcients for 1993 and 1994 measures the additional wage penalty in 
1993 and 1994, respectively.  The model in Column 2 includes only our ﬁve main vari­
ables and a set of time controls. The coefﬁcient for 1992 the year of the reform is negative 
but insigniﬁcant, and the coefﬁcients for 1993 and 1994 are both negative and signiﬁcant 
at one percent conﬁdence level.  This suggests that the effect of the reform is delayed 
one year. Column 3-4 present results from models when additional control variables are 
added stepwise into the model. Adding more and more control variables changes the ini­
tial conclusion.  The size of the 1993 and 1994 coefﬁcients gradually decreases as more 
controls are included into the model. The full model, presented in Column 4, includes a 
full set of individual variables and sector dummies, as well as these interacted with cal­
endar time. In this model only the 1994 coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant. The estimate for 1993 
even has incorrect sign.  We obtain the same result from a simpler model excluding the 
lagged difference in absence, presented in Column 5. 
The results for 1992 and 1993 suggest that there is no individual wage effect.  The 
question then becomes if the signiﬁcant result for 1994 means that there are important 
wage effect that is delayed two years. If we take the pre-reform period ﬁrst step estimate 
and reconstruct an IV. It suggests that one day of additional sickness absence decreases 
the wage increase with about 0.018 percent.10  The difference between P75 and P25 of 
short-term absence is 13 days, which implies that an individual at P75 can expect about 
0.24 percent (0.018*13) lower wage change compared to an individual at P25. This can be 
compared with the mean wage increase in 1992 of 3.4 percent, in other words a quite small 
effect. Moreover, the average worker in Sweden works about 220 day years, it means that 
10The reduced form estimate is -0.0073 and the ﬁrst step estimate is 0.40, which gives an IV estimate of 
−0.0073/0.40 ≈ −0.018. Also note that the outcome is measured as the wage increase in percent (the 
logarithm times 100). 
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the the wage change effect of 0.24 is very small. All coefﬁcients are also very precisely 
estimated.  Based on these main results, with small and precisely estimated coefﬁcients, 
we can rule out any sizeable individual wage effects from the co-insurance reform. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed robustness analysis I will explore a potential 
threat with using the co-insurance reform as a quasi-experiment.  The beginning of the 
1990’s was a turbulent period for the Swedish economy. In the late 1980’s the unemploy­
ment rate in Sweden was extremely low (about 2% in 1988), and by 1994 it had increased 
to about 8%. It is natural to expect that this affect wages. The worsened economic con­
ditions will decrease workers bargaining power.  Crucially, it may affect the bargaining 
power asymmetrically across workers with different absence levels. As discussed above 
those often absent include workers with bad health.  In a recession it is reasonable to 
expect that these workers face a higher risk of being ﬁred, and their bargaining power 
is most likely more negatively affected compared with other workers.  This creates two 
potential problems. 
First, the composition of employed workers in the late 1980’s will be different com­
pared with the composition in the beginning of the 1990’s.  It is taken into account by 
re-estimating the ﬁnal model for a smaller sample of individuals including only those 
who are employed during the whole research period (1989-1994).  The results from this 
exercise is presented in Table 5. Column 1 restates the main results (full sample), and Col­
umn 2 presents the results from our smaller sample of individuals employed during the 
whole period. The results from the smaller sample differ somewhat from the results from 
the main analysis. The estimate of the wage effect in 1992 is negative and signiﬁcant, the 
estimate for 1993 is positive and insigniﬁcant, and the estimate for 1994 is insigniﬁcant. 
The size of all the estimates is very small. These estimates thus give us no reason to alter 
our conclusion about no sizeable wage effects. 
Second, if the bargaining power of insurance prone workers decreases more as a result 
of the recession it will bias the results towards showing stronger wage effects.  Workers 
11Take a replacement rate of 80 percent. The wage and the beneﬁt are both taxable. We then have labor cost 
percentage as 13 ∗ 0.8/220 ≈ 0.047 
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(1)  (2) 
Main sample  Only if working all years 
D92St−2  -0.00133  -0.00603∗∗ 
(0.00179)  (0.00228) 
D93St−2  0.000698  0.00387 
(0.00238)  (0.00341) 
D94St−2  -0.00729∗∗  -0.00515 
(0.00193)  (0.00279) 
St−2  -0.00260  -0.00378 
(0.00191)  (0.00263) 
St−2 − St−3  0.00187∗∗  0.00236∗∗ 
(0.000400)  (0.000579) 
Observations  3,903,359  1,142,229 
R2  0.605  0.740 
Notes:  The  main  sample  is  the  sample  presented  in  the  data  section.  The  smaller  sample  imposes  the  additional 
restriction  that  the  individual  should  be  employed  all  years  between  1989  and  1994.  The  outcome  variable  is  the 
diﬀerence  between  time  period  t  and  time  period  t-1  in  the  logarithm  of  the  wage  times  100.  Individual  variables 
include sex, immigrant, age, age squared, type of education and level of education.  Standard errors robust for within 
ﬁrm correlation and reported in parenthesis.  ∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
that are often absent may simply experience smaller wage increases in the beginning of 
the 1990’s as a result of decreasing bargaining power.  This means that our small and 
precisely estimated insigniﬁcant wage effects could be considered as an upper bound on 
the wage effects.  To investigate this conclusion more carefully I now turn to different 
kinds of robustness analysis. 
6.3  Robustness analysis 
6.3.1  Placebo regressions 
To further analyze the conclusion of no sizeable wage effects from the co-insurance re­
form I run placebo regressions, which test for any pre-existent trends by interacting St−2 
with a dummy for each of the ﬁve years used in our analysis.  The coefﬁcients for 1991 
and 1990 then represent ”treatment effects” for non-existent reforms. Any signiﬁcant esti­
mates for these two years before the reform, indicates a problem with pre-existent trends 
unaccounted for by our large set of control variables.  Column 1 of Table A-1 presents 
results for the full sample and Column 2 for the smaller sample of individuals employed 
during the whole research period.  In both models we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for 
1990 and 1991 the two years before the reform.  It seems that the full model is able to 
account for all pre-reform trends, thereby strengthening our main conclusion. 
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In the baseline speciﬁcation it was assumed that the employers could shift their insurance 
cost over on individual wages.  Even if there are individual wage differences, it may be 
the case that instead of individual wage effects, all workers in high absence ﬁrm receives 
lower wage increases as an result of the co-insurance reform.  To test this hypothesis I 
estimate the same models again, but replace individual absence with ﬁrm absence.  The 
results from ﬁrst step estimates as well as different reduced form estimates is displayed in 
Table A-2. The ﬁrst step estimates, reported in Column 1, shows a very high correlation 
between present ﬁrm absence and ﬁrm absence lagged two periods.  The correlation is 
even stronger than for individual absence. 
Next consider the results from the reduced form estimates. Here I simplify the expo­
sition by assuming that the wage effect is the same in 1992, 1993 and 1994.  The same 
simpliﬁcation is used throughout the remaining robustness analysis. Column 2 reports re­
sults from our main model with a full set of control variables. Column 3 presents a nested 
model including both ﬁrm absence and individual worker absence into the same model. 
The results from these two speciﬁcations suggest signiﬁcant ﬁrm level wage effects from 
the co-insurance reform. However, the results in Column 4 reverse this conclusion. Col­
umn 4 reports the results from a placebo regression, where we have interacted ﬁrm level 
absence with a dummy for each year.  These results reveal strong pre-existent trends in 
1991 and 1990.  In addition the sign of the effect for 1992 is now reversed, indicating a 
positive wage effect of the co-insurance reform.  Based on these results I conclude that 
there is no robust evidence of any important wage effects at the ﬁrm level. 
6.3.3  Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects 
One key assumption for the analysis presented so far is that wages are set at least partly 
individually. The degree of individualized wages differs a lot between different types of 
workers.  Workers with high education and workers employed in the private sector face 
more individualized wages, which theoretically suggests larger individual wage effects. 
In principle it could the case that any important individual wage effects in some sectors 
or in some education levels are hidden in the insigniﬁcant estimates above. I test for this 
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of education. 
The results from this analysis is presented in Table A-3 and Table A-4. If the hypoth­
esis about only wage effects in sectors and education groups with high degree of indi­
vidualized wages is true, there should be negative and signiﬁcant signs for white-collar 
workers, central government workers, and for highly educated workers.  The results for 
different sectors are inconsistent with this pattern. I ﬁnd negative signiﬁcant coefﬁcients 
for central government, regional government workers and blue-collar workers and sig­
niﬁcant positive coefﬁcients for white-collar workers. The pattern for different education 
groups is more inline with the individual wage hypothesis, as expected the coefﬁcients for 
for the most highly educated groups are signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcients, but again the 
size of estimates are very small. Taken together there is no reason to alter the conclusion 
that there are no important individual wage effects from the co-insurance reform. 
6.3.4  Functional form 
The basic model estimated above speciﬁes a linear effect, which may be too restrictive. As 
an additional robustness analysis I therefore present results from two additional more ﬂex­
ible speciﬁcations, including a model with four polynomials of the lagged mean absence, 
and a second model were the individuals have been grouped into six groups accordingly 
to their lagged sickness absence.  Table A-5 displays these results.  The results from the 
polynomial model give very similar results as the baseline speciﬁcation. The linear effect 
is similar to above and counteracted by a positive and signiﬁcant second order polyno­
mial coefﬁcient. In addition the second speciﬁcation with individuals divided into groups 
accordingly to their lagged absence produces no signiﬁcant estimates. 
6.3.5  Sample selection 
The ﬁnal robustness analysis regards the sample selection. As discussed in Section 4, sev­
eral criterions have to be fulﬁlled in order to include the individual in the analysis sample. 
The main restrictions are that only working individuals who stay at the same ﬁrm during 
at least two consecutive years are used in the analysis. In addition some individuals with 
extreme wage increases respectively some individuals with extreme sickness absence are 
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excluded from the sample. In this section I investigate if these restrictions inﬂuence our 
estimates. Table A-6 presents this robustness analysis. Column 1 restates our main results 
in order to simplify the comparison. The sample used in the second model excludes all in­
dividuals with exactly zero wage increase, since this is a indication of misreporting in the 
wage survey data. The sample used in model 3 excludes additional individuals with ex­
treme sickness absence, and model 4-5 exclude individuals with additional extreme wage 
increase. The results from these speciﬁcations show that the results are quite insensitive 
to these different sample restrictions. 
Conclusions 
This paper has investigated whether introducing direct employer incentives in form of 
employer co-insurance into the Swedish sickness insurance affect individual wages. The 
reform introduced a direct cost for employers for each day of short-term absence among 
their workers. Since sickness absence varies substantially between individuals, the reform 
meant that employer’s costs increased sharply for some workers and decreased the costs 
for other workers. Using detailed information on the absence of each individual, past and 
current employment, and survey information on wages, we provide a direct test of a wage 
effect from increased labor costs in form of co-insurance. 
The result interestingly shows small and insigniﬁcant individual wage effects from 
the co-insurance reform. Since we are using a population database the estimates are also 
very precisely estimated. Extensive robustness analyses have also been performed, with 
respect to placebo regressions, functional form, sample selection and we have checked 
for wage effects in certain sectors and for certain education level groups. They all support 
the main conclusion of no sizable wage effects.  In addition any bias due to business 
cycle effects would have been towards showing wage effects. I can therefore rule out any 
sizeable wage effect from the Swedish co-insurance reform. 
These results could be related to the previous scarce evidence on individual wage ef­
fects and employer incentives. Anderson and Meyer (2000) ﬁnd wage effects from expe­
rience rating in unemployment insurance, Gruber (1994) ﬁnd wage effects from mandated 
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health insurance premiums. Interestingly Baicker and Chandra (2005) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant 
wage effects from a growth in health insurance premiums; instead they ﬁnd signiﬁcant 
effects on hours worked and on individual employment. This study contributes to this lit­
erature for at least two reasons. First of all, I provide evidence for Swedish sickness insur­
ance, which resemblance many workers compensation and disability insurances around 
the world.  Previous evidence on the other hand is for other types of insurances, and as 
there is no reason to expect that the effect is the same across insurances this study con­
tributes with valuable insights. Second, previous evidence is concentrated to USA, where 
wages is more often bargained on individual level compared with many European coun­
tries. This study gives results that are very relevant for labor markets with somewhat more 
centralized wages, such as many European countries. It is however important to note that 
our results is not entirely driven by lower level of individual wage bargaining, as our data 
reveal sizeable wage increase difference among workers within the same workplace, even 
after controlling for a rich set of control variables. 
There are several possible explanations to these precisely estimated insigniﬁcant wage 
effects of the co-insurance reform.  Even if ﬁrms had no direct tax cost each time their 
workers are absent from, employers have substantial indirect costs for absent workers. For 
example costs due to production losses and costs associated with ﬁnding a replacement 
worker. If these costs are very large the additional cost in form of the co-insurance tax may 
be less important.  This conclusion is indirectly supported by the results in Andren and 
Palmer (2001), Hansen (2000) and Hesselius (2004), which indicate that work absence in 
general have a large impact on individual wage. 
Another possible explanation is that employer regulates their costs by ﬁring or avoid­
ing hiring insurance prone workers. If employers cannot shift the co-insurance cost over 
to individual wages, they can avoid the co-insurance costs by ﬁring and/or avoiding hir­
ing insurance prone workers.  In other words the non-existent wage effects indicate that 
cream-skimming may have intensiﬁed as a result of the reform.  Cream-skimming have 
severe negative impacts on the employment possibilities of insurance prone workers, i.e. 
workers with bad health. A conclusion that is supported by the results in Harcourt et al. 
(2007) and Baicker and Chandra (2005), who both ﬁnd employment effects. 
IFAU – The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages  30 References 
Anderson, P. & Meyer, B. (1994).  The effects of unemployment insurance taxes and 
beneﬁts on layoffs using ﬁrm and individual data.  NBER Working Paper Serie No. 
4960. 
Anderson, P. & Meyer, B. (2000). The effects of the unemployment insurance payroll tax 
on wages, employment, claims and denials. Journal of Public Economics, 78:81–106. 
Andren, D. & Palmer, E. (2001).  The effect of sickness on earnings.  Department of 
Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Goteborg University, Papers 
in Economics No. 45. 
Baicker, K. & Chandra, A. (2005).  The consequences of the growth of health insurance 
premiums. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 95:214–218. 
Bruce,  C. & Atkins,  F. (1993).  Efﬁciency effects of premium-setting regimes under 
workers compensation:  Canada and the united states.  Journal of Labor Economics, 
11(1):38–69. 
Card, D. & Levine, P. (1994).  Unemployment insurance taxes and the cyclical and sea­
sonal properties of unemployment. Journal of Public Economics, 53:1–29. 
de Jong, P. & Lindeboom, M. (2004). Privatixation of sickness insurance: Evidence from 
the netherlands. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 11:121–143. 
Deere, D. (1991).  Unemployment insurance and employment.  Journal of Labor Eco­
nomics, 9(4):307–324. 
Edin, P.-A. & Holmlund, B. (1995).  The rise and fall of solidarity wage policy?  In: 
Differences and Changes in Wage structures, R. Freeman & L. Katz, ed. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Goldman, D., Sood, N., & Leibowitz, A. (2005).  The reallocation of compensation in 
response to health insurance premium increases. Economics Letters, 88:147–151. 
IFAU – The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages  31 Gruber, J. (1994).  The incidence of mandated maternity beneﬁts.  American Economic 
Review, 84:622–641. 
Hansen, J. (2000).  The effect of work absence on wages and wage gaps in sweden. 
Journal of Population Economics, 13:45–55. 
Harcourt, M., Lam, H., & Harcourt, S. (2007).  The impact of workers´compensation 
experience-rating on discriminatory hiring practices.  Journal of Economic Issues, 
41:681–699. 
Hesselius, P. (2004).  Sickness absence and subsequent wages.  In Economic Studies 82, 
Department of Economics, Uppsala University. 
Hyatt, D. & Kralj, B. (1995). The impact of workers compensation experience rating on 
employer appeals activity. Industrial Relations, 34(1):95–106. 
Hyatt, D. & Thomason, T. (1998). Evidence on the efﬁcacy of experience rating in british 
columbia. A Report to the royal Commission on Workers´ Compensation in BC. 
Jurajda, S. (2004). Recalls and unemployment insurance taxes. Applied Economic Letters, 
11:651–656. 
Koning, P. (2004).  Estimating the impact of experience on the inﬂow into disability 
insurance in the netherlands. Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) 
Discussion Paper. 
Moore,  M. & Viscusi,  W. (1989).  Promoting safety through workers compensation: 
The efﬁcacy and net wage costs of injury insurance.  RAND Journal of Economics, 
20(2):499–515. 
Nilsson, C. (1993).  The swedish model:  Labour market institutions and contracts.  In: 
Labor Market Contract and Institutions, J. Hartoog & J. Theeuws, ed. Elsevier. 
Ruser, J. (1985).  Workers compensation insurance experience-rating, and occupational 
injuries. RAND Journal of Economics, 16(4):487–503. 
IFAU – The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages  32 Ruser, J. (1991). Workers compensation and occupational injuries and illness. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 9(4):325–350. 
Ruser, J. (1993).  Workers compensation and the distribution of occupational injuries. 
Journal of Human Resources, 28(3):593–617. 
Thomason, T. (1993). Permanent partial disability in workers compensation: Probability 
and costs. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 60(4):570–590. 
Thomason, T. & Pozzebon, S. (2002). Determinants of ﬁrm workplace health and safety 
and claims management practices. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55:286–307. 
Topel, R. (1983). On layoffs and unemployment insurance. American Economic Review, 
73(4):541–559. 
Topel, R. (1985).  Unemployment and unemployment insurance.  In: Research in Labor 
Economics, G. Ehrenberg, ed., volume 7, pages 91–135. 
IFAU – The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages  33 Appendix 





Only if working all years 




























Notes:  The  main  sample  is  the  sample  presented  in  the  data  section.  The  smaller  sample  imposes  the  additional 
restriction  that  the  individual  should  be  employed  all  years  between  1989  and  1994.  The  outcome  variable  is  the 
diﬀerence between time period t and time period t-1 in the logarithm of the wage times 100.  Controls include a set 
of individual variables, section section of occupation (2 digits), ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and interactions between time and 
individual and time and of occupation.  Standard errors robust for within ﬁrm correlation and reported in parenthesis. 
∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
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and wages. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Outcome  S f irmt  Δ lnwit  Δlnwit  Δ ln wit 
DS f irmt−2  0.798∗∗  -0.195∗∗  -0.198∗∗ 
(0.000323)  (0.0343)  (0.0345) 
S f irmt−2  0.196∗∗  0.204∗∗ 
(0.0281)  (0.0285) 
S f irmt−2 − S f irmt−3  -0.0942∗∗  -0.0969∗∗  -0.160∗∗ 
(0.0187)  (0.0188)  (0.0262) 
St−2  -0.00808∗∗ 
(0.00158) 
DSt−2  0.00197 
(0.00147) 
St−2 − St−3  0.00330∗∗ 
(0.000396) 
D90S f irmt−2  0.406∗∗ 
(0.0577) 
D91S f irmt−2  -0.103∗∗ 
(0.0376) 
D92S f irmt−2  0.160∗∗ 
(0.0330) 
D93S f irmt−2  -0.129∗∗ 
(0.0377) 
D94S f irmt−2  -0.0342 
(0.0225) 
Observations  760,507  3,903,359  3,903,359  3,903,359 
R2  0.889  0.606  0.606  0.609 
Notes: The table reports ﬁrst stage estimates for number of short-term absence days in 1991 and reduced form estimates 
for the wage increase between time period t  and time period t − 1 in the logarithm of the wage times 100.  Controls 
include a set of individual variables, section section of occupation (2 digits), ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and interactions between 
time and individual and time and of occupation.  Standard errors robust for within ﬁrm correlation and reported in 
parenthesis.∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
Table A-3:  Reduced form estimates. Heterogeneous eﬀects by sector of employment. 
Estimate  S.e. 
Central Gov.  -0.00767∗  (0.00335) 
Regional Gov.  -0.00748∗  (0.00300) 
Municipal.  Gov.  0.00301  (0.00249) 
Blue-Collar  -0.00700∗  (0.00310) 
White-Collar  0.00243  (0.00302) 
Observations  3,904,703 
R2  0.605 
Notes: The outcome variable is the diﬀerence between time period t and time period t-1 
in the logarithm of the wage times 100.  Controls include a set of individual variables, 
section  section  of  occupation  (2  digits),  ﬁrm  ﬁxed  eﬀects,  and  interactions  between 
time and individual and time and of occupation.  Standard errors robust for within ﬁrm 
correlation and reported in parenthesis.  ∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
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Estimate  S.e. 
Education Level 1 
Education Level 2 
Education Level 3 
Education Level 4 
Education Level 5 













Observations  3,904,703 
R2  0.605 
Notes: The outcome variable is the diﬀerence between time period t and time period t-1 
in the logarithm of the wage times 100.  Controls include a set of individual variables, 
section  section  of  occupation  (2  digits),  ﬁrm  ﬁxed  eﬀects,  and  interactions  between 
time and individual and time and of occupation.  Standard errors robust for within ﬁrm 
correlation and reported in parenthesis.  ∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
Table A-5:  Reduced form estimates. Polynomial models and individuals grouped by lagged absence. 
(1)  (2) 
DSt−2  -0.00840∗∗ 
(0.00199) 
DS2 
t−2  0.000265∗∗ 
(0.0000684) 
DS3 
t−2  -0.00000296∗ 
(0.00000132) 
DS4 
t−2  9.56e-09 
(7.80e-09) 
DSgroup2,t−2  -0.0405 
(0.0282) 
DSgroup3,t−2  -0.0627 
(0.0430) 
DSgroup4,t−2  -0.0625 
(0.0578) 
DSgroup5,t−2  -0.0976 
(0.0745) 
DSgroup6,t−2  -0.0918 
(0.115) 
Observations  3,904,703  3,904,703 
R2  0.605  0.605 
Notes:  The outcome variable is the diﬀerence between time period t and time period t-1 in the logarithm of the wage 
times 100.  Controls include a set of individual variables, section section of occupation (2 digits), ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and 
interactions between time and individual and time and of occupation.  Standard errors robust for within ﬁrm correlation 
and reported in parenthesis.  ∗(∗∗) indicates signiﬁcance at 5(1) percent level. 
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